Opinion: Political reintegration of Sunni crucial to Iraq’s recovery
By Nigel Parsons
New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel are heading back to Iraq in numbers.
The battlefield momentum that carried IS into Iraq’s third largest city of Mosul last June has certainly been tempered. Indeed, the US military (perhaps oddly) let it be known that there are plans to retake the city sooner rather than later. In the meantime, Baghdad has not fallen.
In Syria, the Islamic State’s siege of Kobani on the border with Turkey was lifted in late January, the city retaken by Kurdish forces backed by coalition air support. Further into Syria, the self-declared Islamic State’s capital of al-Raqqa is subject to a siege of sorts of its own: the population has been winnowed to less than half of its pre-war level under a fearsome combination of IS rule, non-Syrian jihadis, popular deprivation and alternate Syrian and coalition air raids.
This is the conflict into which a 140-odd strong contingent of NZDF personnel is being deployed. Hard questions have rightly been asked as to why this particular Building Partner Capacity mission is likely to succeed when the previous (and colossal) US-led training mission imploded to such dismal effect.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has issued assurances that this time around it will be different: this Iraqi government is set to be inclusive not exclusive and a reconstructed Iraqi military will be up for the fight. NZDF personnel heading for Taji, the capacious Iraqi military base north of Baghdad, have good reason to hope that he’s right.
IS does appear to be on the back foot. But it remains a formidable opponent. The Iraqi military, with the NZDF and a host of other allies behind them, will know they are in no position to ‘try and nip this thing in the bud’ as our Defence Minister seemed to suggest. And even if military success is forthcoming, in and of itself it will do little to repair Iraq’s fragmented political landscape.
Any lasting solution to the phenomenon of IS lies in politics. First and foremost this means the reintegration of Iraq’s powerful Sunni tribal structures into the government. But deeper than government, Sunni need to regain a stake in the state, particularly the coercive branches such as the police, security services and military that the government in Baghdad commands. This is crucial to rebuilding Sunni confidence in Iraq, and eroding the appeal of the apparent alternative – the Islamic State. And it can only happen with the consent of Iraq’s ascendant Shia community and their capable Iranian sponsors. The matter is deeply politicised.
On which note, perhaps we should all pause to reflect, once again, on the membership fee for the Anglosphere’s Five Eyes surveillance club. The NZDF will no doubt be keen to get on with its latest deployment and set about making a typically professional contribution. But it will at best be a modest contribution. New Zealand is not going to turn the tide of the war against the Islamic State. However, for the sake of placating allies in the Anglosphere, the government’s decision may help turn the Islamic State on New Zealand. If that happens, our troops will likely – but not necessarily – be the first to know.
Dr Nigel Parsons is a senior lecturer in politics in the School of People, Environment and Planning, specialising in Middle East politics.
Dr Parsons has prepared the following Q&A on IS and the military crisis in Iraq and Syria
Q: What is IS?
A: IS (or ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – Arabic for the Levant) began as an al-Qaeda offshoot but was rejected by it last year. ISIS subsequently renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) or caliphate under its leader and self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The Samara-born cleric claims to be the modern-day political successor to the Prophet Muhammad. This has not been achieved without considerable violence. Reports and footage from cities where IS has taken control document public executions, beheadings, crucifixion, immolation, amputations, torture, beatings, kidnap and slavery. But there are also reports of improved public administration, basic service delivery and rudimentary justice.
In a bitter conflict with the Syrian and Iraqi governments, IS has published annual reports since 2012 containing facts and figures of its military exploits. Details run to thousands of military operations including roadside bombings, sniper hits, the burning and bombing houses and places of worship, assassinations using silenced weapons and small arms such as knives.
Q: What is a Caliphate?
A: A caliph is a successor to the Prophet Muhammad and he rules a caliphate, an Islamic political entity governed by Islamic law. Modern national boundaries are deemed (correctly) to be non-Islamic constructions and hence the hugely symbolic act of dissolving the Iraq-Syria border. The Ottoman Empire constituted the last caliphate until it was abolished by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) in 1924.
Q: Who are the Sunni?
A: The majority of Muslims worldwide are Sunni but in Iraq Sunnis are a minority; roughly 20 per cent of the population are Sunni Arabs (a slightly smaller percentage is a different ethnic group, Sunni Kurds). Sunni Islam was the official religion of the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire which governed Iraq before World War I. Sunnis have historically dominated government in independent modern Iraq. Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and the inner circle of his ruling Baath Party were Sunni Muslims.
Q: Who are the Shia?
A: Shia constitute a minority of Muslims worldwide but a 60 per cent majority in Iraq; the Shia are also an overwhelming majority in neighbouring Iran – the big winner from the United States invasion.
Q: What is the difference?
A: The historic division of Shia from Sunni arose early on over the question of succession to the leadership of the Islamic community. Shia held that this ought to be limited to the family of the Prophet Muhammad beginning with his cousin and son-in-law Ali. Sunni were content to follow whoever they deemed competent.
Q: Who are the Kurds?
A: Kurds are a non-Arab ethnic group with their own language and ambitions. Kurds make up somewhere between 15 and 20 per cent of the Iraqi population.
Q: Where does the modern state of Iraq come from?
A: In its heyday, the last caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, stretched from the Balkans and North African to the Gulf and included the three provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. The League of Nations welded these three provinces into Iraq and issued Great Britain a mandate to govern in 1920 (Great Britain secured similar mandates to govern Transjordan and Palestine; France was awarded mandates for Syria and Lebanon). The British installed a Sunni monarchy under King Faisal, who had helped lead the Arab rebellion against the Ottomans alongside T E Lawrence (of Arabia). The Kingdom of Iraq gained independence in 1932.
Q: Does this have anything to do with the Iraq war in 1990-91?
A: Yes, but we have to backtrack first. The Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by a military coup in 1958. The new republic endured 10 years of upheaval until the Baath Party established a firm grip on power in 1968. Vice-President Saddam Hussein nudged aside ailing mentor Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr in 1979. A purge followed, as did the invasion of Iran in 1980 and a disastrous eight year war that cost a fortune in human life and economic ruin before ending in stalemate. An equally disastrous invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to pay for the previous war through oil revenues backfired spectacularly when the US-led coalition forced an Iraqi withdrawal. Sanctions were then imposed on Iraq for failing to disarm.
Q: What happened next?
A: The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 knocked Saddam Hussein, the Baath Party and the Sunni minority from power. US-sponsored elections then allowed the majority Shia to dominate government. But from 2011, Arab Spring upheaval spreading across the Middle East had Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki fearful of a Sunni-led challenge. To guard against this he promoted loyalists from within his own Shia community and particularly from his own Dawa Party to key positions in the police, the intelligence services and the army.
Q: How does this bring us back to the current crisis?
A: Maliki’s actions increasingly alienated Sunni. For example, Sunni vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi was fired then sentenced to death in 2012. He went into exile in Turkey. It meant IS, a receptive Sunni community and a side-lined Baath Party had a common enemy: Maliki’s Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. But in the long run this alliance between IS, ordinary Sunni and resilient Baathists (reorganized as the Naqshbandi Army), shouldn’t be taken for granted. In the meantime the Kurds have taken their chances in the north and secured considerable autonomy from Baghdad; most would like this to translate ultimately into an independent Kurdish state.
Q: What is the US role in all this?
A: Besides the invasion and subsequent missteps, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded with Maliki in 2008 prompted withdrawal of US forces by December 2011. Last year’s battlefield rout by IS led to a huge loss of military assets to the rebels thus drawing a reluctant US back into the fray. Besides the US, Iran has a vested interest in keeping the Islamic State at bay (as does the Asad regime in Damascus) so there is an unlikely alliance shaping up between former enemies.
Q: Is there any relationship to Iraqi oil?
A: Always. Iraq has the world’s fifth largest oil reserves and recently stood as the world’s seventh major producer. The battles in the north have included a struggle for the Baiji refinery 130km north of Baghdad. The Kurds have also taken the opportunity to seize oil-rich Kirkuk. However, Iraq’s major deposits are in the south around Basra; this is Shia territory where the hard-line Sunni Islamic State could scarcely be less welcome.
MASSEY UNIVERSITY