Turkey’s withdrawal from regime-held areas | New Turkish-Russian agreements…reposition and deployment in other locations in “de-escalation zone”
Despite Turkey’s statements and reiterated demands of regime forces’ withdraw from all areas they captured since late April 2019, its threats to expel the Syrian regime from these areas by force, and its rejection of Russia’s proposal a few days ago to reduce the number of Turkish observation posts in regime-controlled areas, the situation on the ground has changed completely.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights revealed on October 19, 2020 that Turkish forces, stationed in the ninth observation post in regime-controlled town of Murek in the northern countryside of Hama started to pack up and disassemble the observation post, in preparation for withdrawal . It is worth noting that Murek observation post is the largest Turkish military post in northern Hama and the Turks have been stationed there for nearly two years and four months. The Turkish columns, which withdrew from Murek observation post, headed to Jabal Al-Zawiyah, nearly 40 km away.
Apparently, Turkish forces recently found out that their presence in this post no longer mattered. However, no Turkish or Russian statements have been released regarding these withdrawals, and if similar remaining posts in regime-held areas would follow suit.
Map of Turkey’s influence in the “de-escalation zone”
According to SOHR statistics, the number of Turkish posts in the “de-escalation zone” has reached 68 posts, and they are as follows: (1) Salwah, (2) Qalaat Samaan, (3) Sheikh Oqail, (4) Tallat Al-Eis, (5) Tallat Al-Tuqan, (6) Sarman, (7) Jabal Anadan, (8) Al-Zaytunah, (9) Qoqfin, (10) the southern Al-Rashideen, (11) Shir Mghar, (12) Ishtabrak as well as other posts recently set up in (13) Anadan, (14) Al-Rashideen, (15) Maar Hattat, (16) Saraqeb, (17) Al-Tarnabah, (18) Al-Nayrab, (19) Al-Mughir, (20) Qumaynas, (21) Sarmin, (22) Taftanaz, (23) Maarrat Al-Na’san, (24) Maarrat Masrin, (25) Al-Jinah, (26) Kafr Karmin, (27) Al-Tawwamah, (28) the 111th Regiment, (29) Al-Mastumah camp, (30) Tramnin, (31) Al-Atarib and (32) Darat Izza, (33) Bardaqli, (34) Nahlaya, (35) Mu’taram, (36) Basnqul, (37) Al-Nabi Ayyoub, (38) Bazabur, (39) Batabu, (40) Kafr Nuran, (41) Ram Hamadan, and (42) Al-Jinah, (43) Besanqoul, (44) Al-Mshirfa, (45) Tal Khattab, (46) Bdama, (47) Al-Najiya, (48) Al-Za’iniya, (49) Al-Ghassaniyah and (50) Al-Kufayr, (51) Bernas, (52) Bdama, (53) Ariha, (54) Jannat Al-Qura, (55) Bsames, (56) Nabi Ayoub hill, (57) Al-Qiyasat, (58) an area near Basanqoul, (59) Marayan, (60) Ma’ratah, (61) Mantaf, (62) Freka, (63) Tel Sheikh Tammam and (64) Al-Jineh, (65) Tal Arqam, (66) Muhambel, (67) Al-Naby Ayoup, and (68) Mntaf.
It is worth noting that 14 of these observation and military posts are now located in regime-controlled areas.
Imminent withdrawals
On October 20, 2020, Syrian Observatory sources reported that Turkish forces continued their preparations to withdraw from their remaining military and observation posts in the Syrian regime-controlled areas in rural Hama and Idlib, in accordance with the Russian-Turkish agreement. The Turkish forces continued to dismantle equipment in Murek, Sher Maghar in the western and northern countryside of Hama, Al-Sarman, Tal Touqan, Tarnabeh, Mardikh, Ma’ar Hatat, and a post in eastern Saraqeb in east and south-east Idlib countryside. Moreover, reports suggest an imminent withdrawal of the Turks from their posts in regime-controlled areas in Aleppo countryside, according to an agreement with the Russians.
Reasons behind Turkey’s withdrawals
The recent Turkish withdrawals from regime-controlled areas could be attributed to Ankara’s realisation that these posts constitute an added burden on Turkey, especially since such posts have taken no part in any defensive or offensive operations in recent time.
Also, Ankara seeks to trade the areas it has withdrawn from, for other key positions in Syria. Logically, Turkey would never forgo a piece of Syria’s territory, unless it got another piece somewhere else or planned to entrench its presence in other areas, and this what SOHR activists monitored on October 20 when a Turkish military column crossed into the “de-escalation zone”, via Kafr Lusin border crossing in the north of Idlib, heading to the rebel-controlled Jozif area in Jabal Al-Zawiyah.
On the other hand, Russian fighter jets escalated the situation when they executed four airstrikes on Jabal Al-Zawiyah, at a time when Turkish troops’ withdrawals were in progressing. In addition, regime forces attacked trucks hired to transport the equipment of the Turkish post in Murek, as Syrian trucks were seen heading to Saraqeb from Tarnabeh area in order to reach Damascus-Aleppo international highway “M5”. The attack resulted in the death of a truck driver on the international highway near Saraqeb, which may result in a future military escalation.
Moreover, the Turks have had tacit understandings and agreements with the Russians concerning several interrelated issues in various regions, including Nagorno-Karabakh file, military talks of the 5+5 formula in Libya (Sirte-Jufra), the winning of the Turkish-backed candidate in northern Cyprus, the discovery of a gas field in the Black Sea with 450 cubic metres of nature gas, the Middle-East region, and recent Turkish-Ukrainian agreement.
The recent withdrawals and movements led to the reposition and deployment of Turkish forces in another territory of the “de-escalation zone”, as Syrian Observatory activists monitored, on October 19, several Turkish military columns heading to the area, including a column of nearly 75 vehicles carrying military and logistical supplies. Accordingly, the number of Turkish military units which have entered the “de-escalation zone” since the new ceasefire came into effect has risen to 7,265, in addition to the entry of hundreds of soldiers.
From February 2 to date, SOHR activists have monitored the entry of more than 10,600 trucks and military vehicles to the “de-escalation zone”, including tanks, personnel carriers, armoured vehicles, mobile bulletproof guard booths and military radars.
All of these developments indicate that new military arrangements on the ground are taking place, and show that it is unlikely that regime forces would retreat to the former frontlines agreed upon in Sochi. As for Russia, it is not expected that Moscow will offer concessions to Turkey and give up more Syrian territory. Unfortunately, these recent movements leave over four million displaced people awaiting an unknown and tragic fate.
It seems that Turkey is deploying in Syria in order to serve specific and unspoken interests which may materialise, in the future, in new military escalation or Turkish-Russian understandings, especially since “Erdogan” wishes to capture the Syria-Turkey border strip from Jisr Al-Shughur to the areas controlled by “Euphrates Shield” operation forces.