Regime-controlled areas in 2022 | Nearly 1,900 fatalities in acts of violence…alarming increase in crime rate…deteriorating security situation…chronic stifling crises

With the many calls by the Syrian regime and its allies upon Syrian refugees to return to their homeland which has become “safe and stable” as they claim, regime-controlled areas experienced several worrying developments, dramatic acts of violence and blatant violations of human rights in 2022, which manifested themselves in escalating displacement and fleeing of civilians these areas and chronic crises.

 

As a human rights organisation, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has monitored and tracked all developments in regime-controlled areas in 2022. These developments can be summarised in the following main points:

 

 

Acts of violence leaves hundreds of fatalities

 

In 2022, SOHR has documented the death of 1,898 people in various acts of violence in regime-controlled areas, including civilians, regime soldiers and officers, Russian and Iranian-backed Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen, ISIS members, gunmen and unidentified individuals; they are distributed as follows:

 

Civilians: 749 civilians: 129 children, 60 women and 559 young and adult men:

 

• 174 civilians, including 32 children and 30 women, were murdered over domestic violence, rapes, thefts and unknown reasons.

 

• 217 civilians, including 11 children and six women, killed in incidents of security disorder in Daraa province.

 

• 149 civilians, including 71 children and eight women, were killed in explosions of old ordnance.

 

• 104 civilians died under torture in regime prisons.

 

• 30 civilians, including eight children and three women, were killed by regime forces and their proxy militias.

 

• 24 civilians, including a child and two women, were killed in indiscriminate gunfire during family and tribal infightings and factional rivalries.

 

• 14 civilians, including a child and three women, were killed by unknown gunmen and in unknown circumstances.

 

• 11 civilians, including three children and seven women, were killed in the collapse of a residential building.

 

• Four civilians, including two children and a woman, were killed in bombardment by opposition factions and jihadists.

 

• 17 civilians were killed by ISIS.

 

• Four civilians were killed in explosions of IEDs and landmines.

 

• The foreman in the cargo department of the ground treatment service in Damascus airport.

 

Non-civilians: 1,149 people:

 

• 244 regime soldiers and proxy militiamen were killed by ISIS in the Syrian desert.

 

• 185 regime military personnel, “collaborators” with regime security services and individuals with settled status working for regime services and backed militias were killed in incidents of security disorder in Daraa.

 

• 159 people killed in bombardment by opposition factions.

 

• 52 people killed in assassinations and armed attacks by unknown gunmen.

 

• 38 regime soldiers and proxy militiamen were killed by explosions.

 

• Ten regime soldiers and proxy militiamen were killed in internal infightings.

 

• Ten regime soldiers were killed in helicopter crash and failed parachuting.

 

• 36 officers and members of the regime’s air-defence forces were killed in Israeli attacks.

 

• 53 Iranian-backed Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen were killed in Israeli attacks.

 

• 27 Iranian-backed Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen were killed by ISIS.

 

• 13 Iranian-backed Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen were killed in assassinations and internal infightings.

 

• 11 Iranian-backed Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen were killed in airstrikes by International Coalition aircraft.

 

• 166 ISIS members were killed in Russian airstrikes and clashes with regime forces in the Syrian desert.

 

• 32 ISIS members and commanders and members of ISIS cells were killed in incidents of security disorder and security campaigns in Daraa province.

 

• 43 former fighters who did not join any military formation, after striking reconciliation deals were killed in incidents of security disorder in Daraa.

 

• Nine unidentified people were killed in incidents of security disorder in Daraa.

 

• 56 gunmen were killed in different infightings and attacks.

 

 

Crime rate is on the rise

 

Since early 2022, regime-held areas have experienced an alarming escalation of crime rates, in light of the failure of regime security services of the Syrian regime to put an end to the chaos and rampant security chaos that prevail across Syrian provinces which are under the control of regime forces.

 

These crimes were committed with various motives and reasons, most notably “theft, revenge, or honour” and other reasons.

 

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented 159 murder crimes that left 174 civilians dead: 30 women, 32 children and 112 men and young men.

 

The fatalities are distributed regionally as follows:

 

• Al-Suwaydaa: 34 civilians: three children, a baby, three women and 27 men.

 

• Rif Dimashq: 33 civilians: six children, eight women and 19 men, including an Iraqi man.

 

• Homs: 26 civilians: two little girls, four women and 20 men.

 

• Hama: 18 civilians: a baby, two children four women and 11 men.

 

• Daraa: 13 civilians: six children, six men and a woman.

 

• Deir Ezzor: 11 civilians: seven men, a child and three women.

 

• Tartus: 11 civilians: four women, four men and three children.

 

• Aleppo: eight civilians: a child, a baby and seven men.

 

• Damascus: eight civilians: a woman, six men and a child.

 

• Latakia: eight civilians: two women, two men and four children.

 

Al-Raqqah: two men

 

• Idlib: a man.

 

• Al-Quneitra: a child.

 

A monthly distribution of crimes across Syria in 2022 and fatalities they left is as follows:

 

• January: 19 crimes left 19 fatalities, including four women and six children.

 

• February: Eight crimes left eight fatalities, including a woman and two children.

 

• March: 13 crimes left 13 fatalities, including a woman and five children.

 

• April: 15 crimes left 16 fatalities, including two women and a child.

 

• May: 13 crimes left 13 fatalities, including a woman and a child.

 

• June: Eight crimes left eight fatalities, including two women.

 

• July: Nine crimes left nine fatalities, including three women and a child.

 

• August: Ten crimes left 13 fatalities, including six women and three children.

 

• September: 19 crimes left 22 fatalities, including six women and three children.

 

• October: 14 crimes left 17 fatalities, including three women and two children.

 

• November: 15 crimes left 18 fatalities, including two women and five children.

 

• December: 16 crimes left 18 fatalities, including four women and four children.

 

Accordingly, September was the most bloody month in 2022, regarding murder crimes in regime-controlled areas, in which 22 civilians were killed, while February and June were the least bloody months with eight fatalities in each one.

 

 

Noticeable escalation in ISIS activity in “the cradle of the Syrian Revolution” amid considerable security chaos

 

Daraa province, the “cradle of the Syrian Revolution,” witnessed worrying escalating rate of security chaos and attacks in 2022, where SOHR documented 532 attacks, which left 493 people dead; and they are as follows:

 

• 217 civilians, including six women and 11 children.

 

• 185 regime military personnel, “collaborators” with security services and members with settled-status working for regime services and backed militias.

 

• 45 former fighters who did not join any military formation, after striking reconciliation deals.

 

• 32 ex-ISIS member and members accused of “belonging to ISIS cells.”

 

• Nine unidentified people.

 

• Five militiamen of the Russian-backed 5^th

 

Here is a monthly breakdown of these attacks:

 

• January: 30 attacks left 24 fatalities.

 

• February: 42 attacks left 34 fatalities.

 

• March: 46 attacks left 41 fatalities.

 

• April: 64 attacks left 45 fatalities.

 

• May: 51 attacks left 47 fatalities.

 

• June: 42 attacks left 39 fatalities.

 

• July: 44 attacks left 44 fatalities.

 

• August: 46 attacks left 33 fatalities.

 

• September: 39 attacks left 34 fatalities.

 

• October: 55 attacks left 60 fatalities.

 

• November: 32 attacks left 58 fatalities.

 

• December: 41 attacks left 34 fatalities.

 

On the other hand, areas in Daraa province experienced noticeable escalation of ISIS operations in 2022. These operations, which were concentrated in Jassim city, its surroundings, Tafas area and Daraa city, were met by intensive security operations by local factions and Russian and regime-backed militias and left dozens dead and wounded.

 

The most prominent operation by ISIS in Daraa in 2022 was documented on October 14 when ISIS commanders were killed in security operations by local factions in Jasim city. According to SOHR sources, “Abd Al-Rahman Al-Iraqi,” a senior ISIS commander, blew himself up in a house where he was holed up with his family in Jassim city, after having been besieged by local factions. Before blowing himself up, Al-Iraqi had taken his family out of the house.

 

In the meantime, local factions managed to explode a nearby house where two ISIS commanders, one Lebanese and one Syrian, were holed up. The explosions killed the two commanders.

 

45 days later, US forces issued a statement announcing the death of Abu Hassan Al-Hashimi, a senior ISIS commander by the “Free Army” in Daraa.

 

 

Tightened security grip and tens of torture victims in prisons and security centres

 

SOHR has monitored and tracked the cause of forcible/arbitrary arrests in regime-controlled areas in 2022, documenting the arrest of 986 people, including three children and 30 women on different charges, the most prominent of which are “evading the mandatory and reserve conscription in the regime army,” “communicating with foreign bodies,” and “cybercrimes.” Many detainees were released after having paid ransoms, while 220 detainees remain in regime prisons and security centres. The people arrested arbitrarily in regime-controlled areas in 2022 are distributed regionally as follows:

 

• Damascus and Rif Dimashq: 243 people, including three women.

 

• Aleppo: 179 people, including nine women.

 

• Daraa: 147 people, including three children.

 

• Deir Ezzor: 109 people, including five women.

 

• Homs: 106 people, including seven women.

 

• Latakia: 52 people, including four women.

 

• Hama: 39 people, including two women.

 

• Idlib: 31 men.

 

• Tartus: 26 men.

 

• Al-Hasakah: 19 men.

 

• Al-Raqqah: 17 men.

 

• Al-Suwaidaa: 13 men.

 

• Al-Quneitra: Five men.

 

And here is a monthly breakdown:

 

• January: 84

 

• February: 45 people, including three women.

 

• March: 17 people, including four women.

 

• April: 21 people, including a woman.

 

• May: 38 men.

 

• June: 45 men.

 

• July: 181 people, including three children and five women.

 

• August: 160 people, including three women.

 

• September: 104 people, including five women.

 

• October: 117 people, including two women.

 

• November: 99 people, including a woman.

 

• December: 75 people, including six women.

 

Moreover, SOHR documented the death of 104 people under torture in regime prisons and security centres in 2022, including three regime officers, three regime army defectors, a fighter from a local faction in Daraa and 38 civilians from eastern Ghouta in Rif Dimashq, whose death certificates were delivered by the Syrian regime to their families in February. Here is a monthly breakdown of torture victims in regime prisons in 2022:

 

• January: 12 people.

 

• February: 45 people.

 

• March: Five people.

 

• April: Three people.

 

• May: Two people.

 

• June: Two people.

 

• July: Two people.

 

• August: Three people.

 

• September: Seven people.

 

• October: Five people.

 

• November: 12 people.

 

• December: Six people.

 

As more fatalities are recorded and updated regularly, the number of civilians dying under torture in regime prisons since the beginning of the Syrian revolution has exceeded 49,400, all documented by names: 48,984 men and young men, 349 children under the age of eighteen, and 67 women over the age of eighteen.

 

Reliable sources have informed the Syrian Observatory that the number of people killed, executed and/or died in regime prisons exceeded 105,000 people. Over 83% of the total death toll were killed and/or died in these prisons between May 2013 and October 2015, the period when the Iranian were supervising regime’s prisons. SOHR sources have also confirmed that more than 30,000 detainees were killed in the notorious prison of Saydnaya alone, while the second largest percentage of killing occurred in the Air-Force Intelligence detention facilities or prisons.

 

 

Tens of civilians kidnapped amid authorities’ failure to control security situation

 

Beside arbitrary arrests, regime-controlled areas experienced scores of kidnaps by unidentified individuals in 2022, with the aim of collecting ransoms in light of the escalating security chaos in all Syrian provinces. In the past year, SOHR documented the kidnapping of 93 people in regime-controlled areas, including ten women and 22 children.

 

The people kidnapped in regime-controlled areas in 2022 are distributed regionally as follows:

 

• Al-Suwaidaa: 22 people, including two children.

 

• Homs: 62 people, including 18 children and ten women.

 

• Daraa: Six people, including a child.

 

• Aleppo: A child.

 

• Al-Hasakah: A man.

 

• Damascus: A man.

 

And here is a monthly breakdown:

 

• January: Six men.

 

• February: Seven men.

 

• March: Four people, including a child.

 

• April: Four people, including a child.

 

• May: Five men.

 

• June: No kidnaps documented.

 

• July: A man.

 

• August: Three people, including a little girl.

 

• September: A man.

 

• October: Eight people, including a woman.

 

• November: Three people, including a child.

 

• December: 51 people, including 18 children and nine women.

 

 

Chronic crises and dreadful humanitarian situation

 

Scenes of hundreds of Syrians queuing outside the “passports and immigration” headquarters have become normal. However, since early 2022, the number of Syrians seeking to obtain visas grew to unprecedented level in an attempt to register their names on a special platform to book a time to obtain visas and leave Syria under slogan of “hope is in travel,” which is contrary to the head of Syrian regime Bashar Al-Assad’s own words “hope is in work.”

 

Growing number of the Syrians aspiring to leave the country contradicts with the state-run Syrian media and officials who promulgate restoring safety and security in the regime-held areas and repeated statements about the regime’s readiness to welcome the refugees’ return to Syria.

 

In January and February, SOHR activist reported that unprecedented crowds in front of the passport and immigration buildings took ascending curve. Since early mornings and even before the employees arrive in, thousands of people queue in different provinces to book a place and submit their personal documents in order to obtain a passport.

 

On the other hand, the regime exploits the situation and imposes additional fees via issuing passports through a premium and speedy service that could cost as much as 900 US dollars in addition to the originally 300 US dollar for the cost of obtaining the passport itself. However, the worsening living conditions force the Syrian people to stand in “long queues” to book an appointment to obtain passports.

 

Additionally, anyone who wants to obtain a passport will find themselves obligated to bribe the employees in the immigration department from the point of entering the building until obtaining the passport.

 

Instead of attempting to handle crises, regime government issued a new decree in February excluding more than half a million families from receiving government rations and subsidised goods and foodstuffs via “smart ration cards.” More than 15% of eligible families and 47% of private car owners were affected by this decision.

 

The standard for lifting the state-subsidy from private car owners depended on the family owning a single car “with an engine capacity exceeding 1,500 CC and the year of manufacture being after 2008.”

 

Also, the government was studying lifting subsidy for people who own several properties or real estate in the same province.

 

The decision was met with broad public discontent in light of the chronic crises in areas controlled by the Syrian regime, particularly the limited income per capita of workers and employees whose monthly salaries ranged from 100,000 to 200,000 Syrian pounds, while the price of gas cylinder reached about 30,000 Syrian pounds.

 

While in March, areas controlled by the Syrian regime witnessed a considerable increase in the price of infant formula, where the price of a packet of infant formula powder milk reached 17,000 to 22,000 SYL (equivalent to six US dollars), as well as the unavailability of infant formula packs in a lot of pharmacies. The crisis of infant formula and the high prices of powder milk have spurred many parents to feed their babies, aged less than six months, water-diluted cow milk.

 

Moreover, the prices of basic products have increased further in light of the faltering economy hit by the sanctions imposed on Al-Assad’s regime and corruption in the governmental institutions. Not to mention the worsening economic and cost of living crises due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as ongoing immigration of young people seeking to flee from the regime’s strict security measures and dreadful living conditions.

 

Also, in April, the government reduced the allowances of state-subsidised fuel provided to public transportation in Damascus by 25% in the wake of the worsening fuel crisis throughout regime-held areas.

 

Streets in Damascus, as well as across all Syrian provinces, were packed with civilians due to “public transport minibuses” halting services over reducing fuel allowances and running out of fuel, causing stifling congestion of passengers in public means of transportation. Civilians in regime-controlled areas suffer from a fuel-shortage crisis that has hit transportation hard, to the extent that these areas run out of fuel, especially during rush hours. However, regime government did not lift a finger to put an end to the dire living and economic conditions.

 

Meanwhile, “Fourth Division” imposed levies on imports that entered via Latakia port. These levies contributed significantly to increasing the prices of products and goods in the Syrian markets. Fourth Division members stationed at checkpoints stopped cargo trucks near the port of Latakia, then an officer gave every merchant a receipt for payment of 20 to 30 % of the merchant’s shipment value and did not allow them to take their goods before paying the required money to Fourth Division officer. In addition, this levy was added to taxes and dues paid to supply and customs officers.

 

In June, regime-controlled areas was strongly hit with acute shortage of fuel; this, in turn, affected the transportation service and other services badly. Moreover, the rate of electricity rationing rose in all Syrian provinces, especially with the current high temperature. The current transport and energy crises affected regime-controlled areas across Syria, however, these crises were concentrated in Damascus, Rif Dimashq and Latakia.

 

Traffic in the capital, Damascus, and Rif Dimashq was paralysed almost completely, especially since the Damascus Provincial Council issued a decision to cut Damascus’ diesel allocations to 30 %, suspend the subsidised fuel allocations for public buses and reduce the subsidised fuel distributions of internal transport to one day only. All these factors negatively affected the transportation sector in Damascus. Although the capital alone needs more than 500 buses, only 130 buses were available to the private sector, while the number of buses available to the public sector was reduced from 100 to 60. The number of buses was reduced under the pretext of “saving and rationing fuel and diesel.”

 

On the other hand, regime authorities keep draining the pockets of Syrians and clamping down on them in order to cover the financial deficit which hit the state treasury for years. In this context, very long queues of people were seen outside passports and immigration departments and offices throughout Syria. This development came after the regime had issued a decision allowing Syrian civilians to obtain passports through a premium and speedy service without any preconditions and raising the fees of applying passports to more than 300,000 SYP. The regime decision prompted thousands of Syrians to flock to immigration and passports departments to file applications for obtaining passports.

 

This indicates to the desire of many Syrians to flee the country, despite all the attempts by the regime and Russia to portray Syria as a “safe country” and repeated statements about securing decent standards of living for the return of refugees who have already fled the regime’s atrocities and security grip and scourge of the raging war.

 

The decision also led to this unprecedented congestion outside immigration departments, as many people wanted to leave the country and did not have the enough money to obtain passports with the help of  brokers working with immigration officials and officers, who had asked for 1,000 to 1,300 USD to issue a single passport.

 

Previously, the issuance of passports through a premium and speedy service was available only for Syrians living outside Syria. While, the issuance of a normal passport had cost 102,000 SYP (25 USD). Such passports might have been issued two years after applying required documents, in the case that those who wanted to travel abroad applied their documents via online registration portals, especially after the actual farce that happened recently when the online registration portals opened to civilians and those who tried to get an appointment to obtain passports.

 

With the beginning of the new school season 2022-2023, regime-controlled areas have experienced broad public anger, because schools have provided poor quality and very worn books, as well as the prohibitively high prices compared to the last season.

 

In this context, SOHR sources have reported that the Syrian regime’s “Public Printing and Textbooks Corporation” has issued a decision raising the prices of school books at high and vocational schools. Accordingly, the new book prices exceed 50% of the monthly income of most of the employees and civilians in regime-controlled areas.

 

SOHR sources have also confirmed that this decision, as well as decisions issued by regime authorities, further burden civilians with poor income, especially with the current dreadful living conditions, extreme poverty and rampant unemployment.

 

According to Observatory sources, the prices of school books for each student in the primary stage are distributed as follows:

 

• Grade 1: Nearly 24,800 SYP.

 

• Grade 2: Nearly 25,300 SYP.

 

• Grade 3: 26,200 SYP.

 

• Grade 4: 21,400 SYP.

 

• Grade 5: 28,500 SYP.

 

• Grade 6: 41,800 SYP.

 

SOHR sources confirm that the expenses of stationeries, school bags, uniform and other supplies which a student need in only one season may reach 500,000 SYP; this level of expenses is unaffordable by most of the Syrian civilians who are almost able to secure their and their families’ daily needs.

 

On the other hand, fuel crisis deteriorated greatly throughout areas controlled by the Syrian regime, because of the high demand in light of the currently cold weather and acute shortage of fuels, mainly petrol and diesel, at a time when the regime’s authorities seem indifferent and have failed so far to secure the needs of the residents of fuels. In Damascus, text messages, which inform beneficiaries of the delivery of fuel allowances at petrol stations in order to receive their allocations of fuel, delayed for more than 13 days.

 

Also, markets in most of areas controlled by the Syrian regime have run out of diesel for no reasons, which led to the current stifling crisis. Diesel is sometimes available on black markets, but it is sold at very high prices, which further burdens civilians.

 

On the other hand, drivers of public vehicles are struggling with the acute shortage of petrol. Regime authorities have allocated 200 litres of petrol to every car. However, the amount which is actually distributed is 75 litres, after waiting a role for ten days. In an attempt to secure petrol, regime’s Department of Fuel has raised the price of petrol from 27,500 SYP to 62,500 SYP every 25 litres. However, petrol has not been available at petrol stations so far. Ironically, petrol is available on black markets, so civilians find themselves obligated to buy it for prohibitively high prices.

 

As text messages are delayed for 13 or 14 days, a car owner could not got more than 50 litres of petrol every month. Accordingly, car owners are forced to stop working on their cars or to buy petrol on black markets, which makes them shoulder extra burdens.

 

With the beginning of winter, the chronic and successive crises in Damascus and Rif Dimashq have badly impacted the already deteriorating services and transportation and make civilians and farmers shoulder extra burdens.

 

In this context, SOHR sources reported that the rate-setting committee in Damascus has issued a decision increasing the price of electricity to 300 up to 400 SYP in light of the acute shortage of fuels. The new increase has led to increasing the prices of all products in those provinces, while the price of fertilisers has been doubled. Meanwhile, the Syrian telecom company has suspended work because of the lack of fuel needed to operating power generators, putting several telephone exchange centres out of service.

 

It is worth noting that the Syrian currency hit a record low in late 2022, where the Syrian pound against the US dollar reached 7,000 SYP. In early 2022, the Syrian pound against the US dollar recorded 3,500 SYP. The disastrous currency plunge led, in turn, to the increase of prices of food, medicines and fuels.

 

 

“Symbolic” reconciliations

 

Several areas controlled by the Syrian regime witnessed reconciliation deals in 2022, struck by suspects, military deserters and defectors and young people who passed their date of joining the mandatory and reserve service to regime’s security branches with security services. In February, centres were opened in Al-Keswa, Muadamiyat Al-Sham, Darya Al-Tel in Rif Dimashq, Maskanah in east Aleppo countryside and Al-Sabkha in east Al-Raqqah countryside, for allowing security suspects and young men who evaded mandatory conscripting to settle their security status. The reconciliations included all wanted people by regime security services for “state security” and “criminal” cases, as well as young men who evaded mandatory conscripting in the regime army and regime army defectors on condition that they must re-join their military units.

 

While in March, Regime security services opened new “settlement/reconciliation centres,” allowing suspects to settle their security status. The centres were opened in Dabsi Afnan and Al-Sabkhah in Al-Raqqah countryside, Maskanah in Aleppo countryside, Al-Tel and Assal Al-Ward in western Qalamoun in Rif Dimashq.

 

Also, in June, regime security services opened “reconciliation centres” in Jiroud city in eastern Qalamoun, Al-Nabak, Yabroud and Qarrah in Rif Dimashq, allowing suspects to settle their security situations.

 

On October 6, Syrian regime intelligence service opened a “reconciliation centre” in Al-Suwaidaa province, where civilians can have their security situations settled. According to SOHR activists, the “7th of April” Hall was opened to receive Syrian civilians and military personnel covered by Amnesty Decrees No. 2 and 7 issued by Syrian regime president in 2022, who wanted to settle their security status. The Amnesty Decrees also covered suspects, military deserters and young people who passed their date of joining the mandatory and reserve service to regime’s security branches. However, the decrees did not cover individuals involved in personal suites.

 

Similarly, on October 24, SOHR activists reported that regime forces began a “comprehensive settlement process” in the municipality square in Douma. According to SOHR activists, the settlement process covered the cities and towns of eastern Ghouta and several affiliated and surrounding districts, such as Adra Al-Balad, Douma, Al-Nashabiyeh, A’rbin, Kafr Batna, Saqba, Ain Tarma and Zamalka. In those areas, fugitives, suspects and military deserters were invited to settle their security status by attending and submitting applications at the administrative unit building in eastern Ghouta.

 

While in late October, members of the ruling party in Syria, the Arab Socialist Baath Party, called on the residents of Arbin in eastern Ghouta in Rif Dimashq to strike “settlement deals” to immediately remove their names from the lists of arrest warrants in all security branches. Syrian regime intelligence service was preparing to establish a “settlement centre” in the municipal building in Arbin city in order to launch the settlement process.

 

On November 10, regime government announced the initiation of settlement deals for wanted persons within and around Al-Nashabiyeh area in Rif Dimashq. This came as a part of the ongoing settlement deals, and the opening of several centres recently initiated by the regime government to attract displaced persons outside regime-held areas.

 

While on November 16, the comprehensive settlement committees began their work in Saqba city in Eastern Ghouta to complete the settlement of the security status of the residents of Rif Dimashq and to register persons wishing to settle their security status after the end of its work in the previous day in Ain Tarma town. Although the Committee called on all people to settle the status of fugitives, defaulters and suspects by regime security services by attending and submitting applications at the Administrative Unit building in Eastern Ghouta, the turnout of the people remains low.

 

Similarly, on November 13, the settlement process began at “settlement centre” recently established by the regime forces in Al-Waer neighbourhood of Homs, following a meeting that brought together dignitaries from Homs city with Homs governor and military figures to settle the status of civilians and military wanted by the security services. This came as a part of the regime’s efforts to attract civilians outside areas under the control of regime forces by inviting them to strike reconciliation deals. According to SOHR activists, the Centre began to settle the status of wanted for security services from Homs and other Syrian provinces. However, SOHR activists have monitored low turnout, where not more than 200 people headed to the centre on the first day, despite the regime promoted the reconciliation a week earlier, and made media buzz to open a centre for reception in Al-Moared city in Al-Waar neighbourhood in Homs.

 

 

Uprising by Jabal Al-Arab residents against Syrian regime and Iranian-backed militias

 

Al-Suwaidaa province experienced large-scale protests and demonstrations in several areas over the Syrian regime’s decision lifting governmental subsidy provided to a large number of civilians. The protestors’ demands were as follows:

 

• Turning Syria into a civil state without partisan or racial discrimination.

 

• Getting rid of authoritarianism and monopoly of the economy by the ruling class.

 

• Reaching a state of law and institutions and getting rid of corruption and repression.

 

• Investigation in cases of corruption and hold corrupt people accountable.

 

• Bringing back Syria’s looted funds and stopping providing the state treasury with the people’s money.

 

• Cancellation of smart ration cards, preservation of all rights of Syrian citizens to enjoy decent standards of living and securing of all their needs.

 

• Cancellation of security permits on documents of selling and buying real estate and authorization documents.

 

• Cancellation of customs duties.

 

• Controlling prices of all products to fit the current salaries.

 

• Disclosing the fate of detainees by listing them and referring these lists to impartial and independent courts.

 

• Tracking and disclosing the fate of the forcibly disappeared.

 

• Supporting farmers and enabling them to invest in their farms according to serious plans to improve the agricultural production.

 

• Countering the phenomenon of prevalence of drug business (the protestors stated that they would not accept that their province to be turned into a passage for smuggling drugs to neighbouring countries).

 

• Starting a survey and search for the needy, who have no sources of income, and modifying the Social Security Act.

 

• Enforcement of the laws preserving the rights of the families of “martyrs” and injured people throughout Syria without discrimination.

 

While in September, Al-Suwaidaa province witnessed angry protests staged by dozens of civilians who protested the poor living conditions and services. The protestors blocked the ring road and Damascus-Al-Suwaidaa highway near Hazm village, north of Al-Suwiadaa province.

 

According to SOHR activists, the protestors gave a deadline to the governor of Al-Suwaidaa and Syrian regime government to fulfil their demands which were manifested in securing essential needs, such as diesel, petrol, and gas, and resuming pumping water to civilian homes in days, threatening to escalate protests, if their demands were not fulfilled.

 

Also, on September 29, SOHR activists reported seeing regime forces on high alert in Al-Suwaida, near the Cultural Centre, following the arrival of a security delegation from the capital, Damascus, headed by Hossam Luqa, the Director of the General Intelligence Department and Minister of Interior, to meet with representatives of local factions, Al-Aqel Sheikhs of the Druze community and several social and religious leaders from Al-Suwaidaa to discuss security developments in Al-Suwaidaa province.

 

According to Observatory sources, the meeting has tackled ways to improve the security situation and living and economic conditions and to find solutions to the issue of security disorder, proliferation of arms and stolen cars.

 

On the other hand, the province of Al-Suwaidaa experienced violent events and dramatic developments in July, which led to the elimination of a prominent gang affiliated to the regime military security in the province, which worked publicly for Iranian-backed militias.

 

These events started on July 23 when tens of residents from Shahbaa city in Al-Suwaidaa province gathered on Damascus-Al-Suwaidaa highway, near Salakhed junction, protesting the arbitrary arrest of two young men from Shahbaa city by a group led by a man known as “Raji Falhout.”

 

On the previous day, local groups in Al-Suwaidaa arrested two colonels, a first lieutenant and a police man  in Shahbaa city, as a response to the detaining of the two young men from Shahbaa city by “Raji Falhout” group and to pressure on the group to release the young men. Accordingly, the number of detained people have increased to six.

 

On July 26, tension returned to Al-Suwaidaa province following the arrest of five young men from Shahbaa city by armed groups of “military security” forces. “Military security” groups also set up several checkpoints on Shahbaa-Al-Suwaidaa road, areas near Atil town and on Al-Hajj road at the western entrance to Al-Suwaidaa city, where these groups rigorously inspected civilians passing through checkpoints. Moreover, local factions were put on high alert in Shahbaa city and on Damascus-Al-Suwaidaa highway in light of the latest practices by regime armed groups.

 

Hours later, tension grew further among local factions in Al-Suwaidaa, amid escalation of tension with groups of the military security service and warnings against travelling on streets leading to Salim and Atil villages, where military checkpoints had been deployed.

 

The dramatic developments, which started on July 26, led to the death of 23 gunmen; they were as follows:

 

• 16 members of “Raji Al-Falhout” faction.

 

• Seven local gunmen who were killed while they were attacking headquarters of “Raji Falhout” faction in Salim and Atil towns.

 

SOHR sources reported earlier that local groups from Al-Suwaidaa province, led by Sheikh Al-Karama forces, managed to free several people of those held by Raji “Al-Falhout” groups, amid intensive gunfire and a gathering of hundreds of people at Al-Mashnaqah roundabout, who celebrated the elimination of “Al-Falhout” group, after the death and injury of many “Al-Falhout” affiliated members and escape of others. Meanwhile, the fate of the leader of the group remains unknown.

 

The security campaign continued in the following month, where local factions in Al-Suwaidaa, led by Sheikh Laith Al-Balaous, Al-Jabal Brigade and anti-terrorism forces, encircled Qanawat town in the north-eastern of Al-Suwaidaa countryside on August 11. These local factions launched a new security campaign in search of suspects belonging to Raghi Falhout group and another group known as “Al-Fahd Forces,” led by Salim Hamid which is affiliated with the military intelligence service. This security campaign comes as a part of the ongoing efforts by local factions to eliminate groups operating under the banner of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias.

 

While on August 29, tension grew between local factions and other factions backed by the Lebanese Hezbollah and military security service in Qanawat town in the northern countryside of Al-Suwaidaa. According to SOHR sources, local armed factions in Al-Suwaidaa and “Rejal Al-Karamah” movement,” with the help of residents, carried out a raid campaign targeting the commander and members of “Al-Fahd Forces” which are backed by the Lebanese Hezbollah and military security service in Qanawat town.

 

This came after the release of the group’s commander, Salim Hamid, by a local faction known as “Liwaa Al-Jabal,” at the request of the religious authority, led by the spiritual leadership of Druze, which ignited a state of tension in the area.

 

On December 4, Al-Suwaydaa city experienced significant security tension, after protestors had pelted the governorate building with stones, while some young men stormed the building and tore up the poster of Bashar Al-Assad, demanding the overthrow of the Syrian regime.

 

Protesters burned a security vehicle and damaged other cars after security forces had violently pushed back demonstrators and fired bullets in the air, attempting to disperse protesters in Al-Suwaydaa city.

 

Protesters moved from Al-Mashnaqah roundabout, the “main centre of protests,” to Al-Seer square in Al-Suwaydaa city centre where they set fire to rubber tyres. The protestors denounced poor living conditions and chanted slogans calling for improvement.

 

Moreover, a young man died of his injuries, while another remians in intensive care, and six others sustained various injuries, as regime security services dealt violently with the protestors when they stormed the governorate building and burned government cars in Al-Suwaydaa city. The injured people were taken to the governmental hospital in Al-Suwaydaa city.

 

 

Syrian desert: ISIS kills tens of combatants and civilians

 

ISIS continues its intensive attacks on different areas of the Syrian desert, a message for the regime forces and their allies that the Islamic group still has enough power to respond. Clearly, ISIS fighters are still deployed in nearly 4,000 square kilometres all along Jabal Abu Rajmin region in north-eastern Palmyra and the desert of Deir Ezzor and its western countryside, and Al-Sukhna desert and north of the administrative borders of Al-Suwaydaa province.

 

The areas of Aleppo-Hama-Al-Raqqah triangle, Homs and Deir Ezzor deserts, experience bombings, ambushes and attacks almost daily by ISIS that are countered by periodic security operations of regime’s forces and their proxy factions under cover of the Russian fighter jets.

 

In 2022, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented the death of 288 people in over 104 security operations by ISIS in the Syrian desert.

 

The fatalities are distributed as follows:

 

• 244 members of regime forces and their proxies.

 

• 27 Iranian-backed Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen.

 

• 17 civilians.

 

 

Ongoing attacks by Israel and Coalition

 

Israel continues to violate Syria’s sovereignty, citing the large military presence and expansion of Iranian forces and their proxy militias as an excuse. SOHR is used to hearing the Syrian regime’s empty mantra that it always reserves the right to respond to Israeli attacks, while Damascus seems satisfied with press releases and condemnation.

 

SOHR documented 32 airstrikes and ground rocket attacks in 2022, during which Israel targeted several positions in Syria, destroying nearly 91 targets, including buildings, warehouses, headquarters, centres and vehicles.

 

These strikes killed one civilian and 89 combatants and injured 121 others. The fatalities are distributed as follows:

 

• Two Iranian officers of Al-Quds Corps.

 

• 11 Iranian-backed Syrian militiamen.

 

• 29 Iranian-backed non-Syrian militiamen.

 

• 36 regime officers and members of the regime’s air defences.

 

• 11 Syrian and non-Syrian militiamen working for the Lebanese Hezbollah.

 

• The foreman in the cargo department of the ground treatment service in Damascus airport.

 

Those attacks also left 23 civilians, including a little girl and three women at least, injured.

 

Meanwhile the attacks are distributed regionally as follows:

 

• Damascus and Rif Dimashq: 18 attacks.

 

• Al-Quneitera: five attacks.

 

• Hama: four attacks.

 

• Tartus: two attacks.

 

• Aleppo: two attacks.

 

• Homs: two attacks.

 

• Latakia: one attack.

 

• Deir Ezzor: one attack.

 

SOHR would like to point out that Israel sometimes targeted more than one province in a single attack.

 

On the other hand, SOHR documented 11 airstrikes carried out by US aircraft and Coalition drones on Iranian positions in 2022, which targeted positions, headquarters, posts and vehicles in west Euphrates region in Deir Ezzor province. These attacks killed 11 people and injured over 23 others, some seriously.

 

 

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has been all along warning against the repercussions of the crippling chronic crises and security chaos in regime-controlled areas and elsewhere in Syria, with only the Syrian regime to blame for the disastrous situation Syria is in right now. We, at the Syrian Observatory, call upon all international actors not to abandon their responsibility and obligations towards the people of Syria and urge them to find a lasting solution to the tragedy of millions of Syrians and bring Al-Assad, his affiliates and all those responsible for violations and those who aided and abetted the killing of Syrian people to justice.