Syrian opposition: Move, disband, or do the bidding of others

This author has predicted for years that Bashar al-Assad, if carried by Russia and Iran to military dominance, would become the poster child for “catastrophic victory.” What is left of Syria’s economy is now imploding under the pressures of incompetence, corruption, sanctions, and coronavirus. As it does, the ruling clan feuds over who gets to pocket whatever is left. Assad’s illegitimacy and unsuitability have become clear to everyone beyond his closest relatives. Perhaps it is also clear to them.

Recent events inside Syria pose a question: Can the Syrian opposition outside Syria play a constructive political role if the regime begins to wobble or topple?

This is not to predict Assad’s imminent fall. Indeed, two important actors will likely try hard to prop him up indefinitely.

Iran cannot afford a valuable subordinate to disappear. Yes, there is talk that some Iranian officials are weary of costly foreign adventures given the dual strains of US sanctions and COVID-19. But losing the organic Syrian link to the Islamic Republic’s Lebanese presence, Hezbollah, would be a setback of immense proportions. “Who lost Lebanon?” would be a divisive, finger-pointing exercise animating the politics of the Islamic Republic for as long as politicized and corrupt mullahs, their smooth-talking front men, and their violent enforcers rule the country.

Increasing numbers of Russian officials and scholars are concluding that Assad is the worst client imaginable. But they face the fact that President Vladimir Putin’s personal political interests diverge, on Syria at least, from the national security interests of the Russian Federation. Russia would be much better off with a Syrian national unity government devoid of regime figures, but pledged to an ongoing partnership with the Kremlin. Putin, however, still sees Assad himself as “Exhibit A” for his domestic political claim of having personally returned Moscow to great power status. After railing for years about the alleged violent regime change proclivities of the Obama administration, how could Putin now try to unseat—albeit for the sake of Russia—the character he claims to have saved?

Still, Syria’s dire economic and social conditions, compounded by regime divisions, hardly encourage certainty about Assad’s long-term political survival. His ability to command Syria’s organs of state violence and terror has always been rooted in the perverse legitimacy he has enjoyed as the designated successor of the regime’s founder and principal architect: Hafez al-Assad. Regime insiders—even those acutely aware of his leadership limitations—have long calculated that the removal of Bashar al-Assad could produce a violent political free-for-all, returning Syria to the pre-1970 era of conspiracies and coups. But what if the ruling family itself is the source of instability?

Any move to sideline Assad would be primarily an insider operation. But those seizing power would not inherit the Assad legacy. They would face the challenge of consolidating their positions on some sustainable basis, fifty years after the Hafez al-Assad “Corrective Movement.” One option would be to broaden their political base by inviting opposition figures from inside Syria and abroad to discuss a national unity arrangement. Is the external opposition prepared to play a constructive role?

Since 2017, the main body of that external opposition—the Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC)—operates in Riyadh. The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC)—founded in 2012—is in Istanbul. These headquarter arrangements make it hard for the external opposition to act with independence and unity on behalf of over twenty-million Syrians inside and outside Syria; people who have suffered from the criminality of the Assad regime, and from the responses of regional actors pursuing self-interested and sectarian remedies. “Hard” may become “fatal” if the regime starts to unravel.

Turkey remains an important NATO ally of the United States, and Ankara’s complaints about the failure of the Obama administration to seek a joint Syrian strategy were fully justified. President Barack Obama’s main priority was to prevent slaughter in Syria from upsetting his cultivation of Iran. His strategy, featuring diplomatic sound and fury, signified nothing. The Trump administration, mainly through the efforts of a talented State Department team and a capable ambassador, has tried hard to get on the same page as Ankara. It is a difficult effort that has nevertheless paid some dividends. It is worth sustaining. And although Washington’s bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia is tested by what today passes for leadership in Riyadh, surely it too is a relationship worth preserving. That the Riyadh-Ankara relationship itself is mutually antagonistic complicates American efforts to coordinate Syria policy.

For the external opposition, however, questions remain: If the Assad regime begins to crumble, will its main components be obliged to act as extensions of Saudi and Turkish policies and priorities? Would it be able, from Riyadh and Istanbul, to serve the interests and priorities of Syrians inside Syria and Syrian refugees? If the SNC and SOC conclude they cannot, under current circumstances, be independent bodies dedicated to serving Syrians, their choices are clear: Disband, move, or do the bidding of others.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey could, of course, preempt these hard choices by according the opposition broad freedom of action. This would be highly unlikely. All regional powers opposing Assad have sought cooperative clients; they have tried to bring Assad down for their own interests, not for the sake of Syrians seeking civilized governance.

Indeed, the United States itself has rarely focused on the conflict’s center of gravity: Syrian civilians. Instead, it chose operationally to ignore regime mass homicide, except during the Trump administration, when twice the regime conducted sarin gas atrocities. Washington also declined to work with the Syrian opposition to create in northeastern Syria a governance alternative to Assad. The country that twice liberated Europe, oversaw the Marshall plan, and prevailed in the Cold War simply decided that helping Syrians build legitimate governance in areas liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was a bridge too far. The result is an opposition still largely in exile and a United States still recognizing a war criminal as Syria’s president.

Syria’s external opposition has often been fractious, reflecting in some measure the desires and dictates of regional powers providing refuge and/or funding. The SNC and SOC contain some talented people; Syrian patriots who see the Assad regime and violent Islamists as two sides of the same coin; a coin purchasing sectarian division and lawlessness. The external opposition, for all its difficulties, has never deserved the mocking opprobrium heaped on it by foreigners seeking to mask their own failures.

But if political tectonic plates are beginning to shift inside Syria, the moment of truth is approaching the external opposition. To the extent it must continue to operate in exile, it must not do so in Syria’s neighborhood; not if it wishes to act independently on behalf of Syrians. Proximity to Syria seems superficially attractive. It is, in fact, poisonous; it produces dependence and subordination born of captivity.

Western Europe would certainly be a better temporary home for the external opposition than any regional power. This is not to suggest that Europe—any more than the United States—has acted effectively to protect Syrians, or Syria’s neighbors, or even itself over the past decade. But the European Union or several of its members could offer the opposition something regional powers cannot: Places in which to plan, deliberate, and act on behalf of Syrians free of pressures arising from parochial interests. If the regime that has ruined Syria is beginning to unravel, the external opposition must move to places where it has a chance to influence Syria’s political direction independently, and for the benefit of Syrians.

Source: Syrian opposition: Move, disband, or do the bidding of others – Atlantic Council

 

Opinions expressed in this article reflect the opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Observatory.